The National Reconnaissance Office

 Seal Podium Plaque

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Click Here for larger image

Plaque of the Central Security Service Seal

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) a Department of Defense agency tasked to ensure that the United States has the technology and spaceborne and airborne assets needed to acquire intelligence worldwide, including support to such functions as monitoring of arms control agreements, indications and warning, and the planning and conducting of military operations. This mission is accomplished through research and development, acquisition, and operation of spaceborne and airborne intelligence data collection systems. The NRO  designs, builds and operates the reconnaissance satellites of the United States government. It also coordinates collection and analysis of information from airplane and satellite reconnaissance by the military services and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is funded through the National Reconnaissance Program, which is part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

The NRO works closely with its intelligence and space partners, which include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the United States Strategic Command.

The National Reconnaissance Office was created on 25 August 1960 following months of intense controversy between the White House, CIA, the Air Force and the Department of Defense over the allocation of responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance. In the aftermath of the 1 May 1960 downing of Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower on 10 June directed Defense Secretary Thomas Gates develop recommendations on the future of space intelligence collection. Gates appointed a panel headed by Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph Charyk, who was joined by Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering John Rubel and Presidential Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky. Their report to the National Security Council (NSC) on 25 August marked the formation of the NRO. The decision to form a "national" agency was intended to ensure that the interests of all parties, including the military and civilian intelligence communities, would be represented in the utilization of space systems.

By 1961 the Agency and the Air Force had established a working relationship for overhead reconnaissance systems through a central administrative office, whose director reported to the Secretary of Defense but accepted intelligence requirements through USIB. By informal agreement, the Air Force provided launchers, bases, and recovery capability for reconnaissance systems, while the Agency was responsible for research, development, contracting, and security. Essentially, the agreement allowed the Agency to decide which systems would be deployed, and the Air Force challenged the CIA's jurisdiction.

A primary mission was at stake in these negotiations, and the struggle was fierce on both sides. Control by one agency or another did not involve only budgets and manpower. Since the Air Force and CIA missions were very different, a decision would affect the nature of the reconnaissance program itself -- tactical or national intelligence priorities, the frequency and location of overflights, and the use of data.

The agreement that emerged in 1965 attempted to balance the interests of both the Air Force and the CIA. A three-person Executive Committee, (EXCOM) for the administration of overhead reconnaissance was established. Its members included the DCI, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the President's Scientific Advisor. The EXCOM reported to the Secretary of Defense, who was assigned primary administrative authority for overhead reconnaissance systems. The arrangement recognized the DCI's authority as head of the community to establish collection requirements in consultation with USIB; it also gave him responsibility for processing and utilizing data generated by overhead reconnaissance. In the event that he did not agree with a decision made by the Secretary of Defense, the DCI was given the right to appeal to the President.

The agreement represented a compromise between Air Force and CIA claims and provided substantive recognition of the DCT's national intelligence responsibility. As a structure for decision-making, it has worked well. However, it has not rectified the inherent competition over technical collection systems that has come to motivate the intelligence process. The development of these systems has created intense rivalry principally between the Air Force and the Agency over program deployments. With so much money and personnel at stake with each new system, each organization is eager to gain the benefits of successful contracting. As a result the accepted solution to problems with the intelligence product has come to be more collection rather than better analysis.

NRO Website, Federation of American Scientists, US Intelligence Community

Air Force	Army	Marines	Navy	Coast Guard	National  Guard	Agencies & Dept

All Prices Include U.S. Standard Delivery - Worldwide Delivery Available

The Finest Military Plaques, Seals & Name Plates Available

Military Plaques Weblog